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IN THE SUPRE~E COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
;;1JPPI:RS COl·iPANY, INC. , 
vs . 
Plaintiff-
Eespondent, 
Civil No. 15612 
. 1CORD-HARRIS CONSTRUCTION 
rn:iPANY, a corporation and 
r ll:J::MAN' S FUND, a corporation. 
Defendants-
Appellants. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiff subcontractor 
'or monies due and owing under a completed subcontract, in 
.~ich Defendant general contractor claimed specified offsets 
.• 10 to an alleged breach of the subcontract. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Upon motion of the Plaintiff the court granted a 
:.:rtial Summary Judgment from which the Defendants appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT O~ APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks affirmance of the Partial Summary 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant Acord-lldrris Construction Comp 0,ny ,,,_,s 
the general contraclor for the construction of the Der 
Special Events Center on the campus of Weber Sta~P Collr 
in Ogden, Utah. On March 24, 1975 pursuant to thal prh,~ 
contract, Defendant and Plaintiff Koppers Company, Inc. 
entered into a written subcontrcict whereby Plaintiff \'l(•ul -
fur!'lish a wood dome for the Center. The con tract price 
agreed on between the parties for the labor and materials 
was $766,168. 
Plaintiff Koppers completed its performance uncb 
the subcontract in 1976 and sought the balance due and o· .. :'., 
under the contract price. Upon Defendant's failure to w3'.-
proper payment, Plaintiff instituted this suit on March 2r', 
1977 against Defendant Acord and its surety, Fireman's ru.:, 
for breach of the subcontract (hereinafter referred to as 
singular "defendant"). In its complaint, Plaintiff dckr.o«:-
ledged receipt of $615, 490 in progress payments, ancl soGj'.' 
the balance of the subcontract price in the sum of $150,67'. 
(R. 1-9) 
The Defendant by answer and counterclaim ac'lmi ttc-
the subcontract with the price of $766,148 and pziymcn~'' ': 
of $615, 490, and generally denied a breach of the sulxcwtr: 
and the balance due of $150,678. (R 12-26, 54-88) The 
Defendant as its only defense, which it also proffc10J 
counterclaim, alleged a breach of the subcon tr,:ic L c• 11 1 
-2-
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l'til of Plaintiff resultin':) in do.mage to Dcfendcint. fl0wcvcr, 
rhc Defendant only clairnec1 da:;1,::ige to the extent of $76,646 
;or redesign of certain trusses and $20,000 for mistake made 
on a light support ring, for a total clairnccl offset of 
$%,646. (R 12-26, 38, 54-88) 
Using the discovery process, Plaintiff tried to 
ascertain the possible extent of Defendant's claimed damages. 
In July 1977 Defendant in answers to interrogatories, 
reduced the claimed damage for the light ring problem from 
$20, 000 to $12, 320. (R 38) 
The pleadings thus indicated that Plaintiff was 
claimin':) payments due of $150,678, with Defendant's only 
clcfcnsc b<.:>ing an offset of $88,966 for the allcg<.:>d breaches 
or the subcontract. Thus, there was a difference of $61,712 
between the claim of $150,678 and the all<.:>ged offset of 
$88,966. Plaintiff on November 8, 1977, filed a Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment for the amount of the undisputed 
clifferencc. 
On November 23, 1977, the Defendant filed the 
affidavit of M. L. Harris in oppositio~ to the Motion for 
PartL1l Summu.ry Judgment. (R 119-122) The affidavit purports 
to put material issues of fact into controversy by stating 
th::it all of Defendant's previous damage claims have been 
~ere estimates and that other additional costs such as 
su~crvisory and consequential costs, are chargeable to 
-3-
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Plaintiff. It should be remembered that this affidavit 
filed over on<? year a· er Plaintiff had cc._;1,pletecl its 
subcontract. However, even at this late date in the pi 
ceeclings, the Defendant was unable to set out what in frlc 
the costs would be. Rather, the affiant stated thot "it jc 
his information and belief that said costs are in execs~" , 
those previously claimed. (R 120) The only aclcli lioniil 
that could be put into issue was a charge of $850 claimed 
due because of the redesign of the trusses. (R 120) 
On December 5, 1977 District Judge J. Duffy Pairrc 
held a hearing on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Based on the pleadings as presented and after statements c' 
counsel, Judge Palmer granted the Partial Summary Judgment 
in the amount of $60,862. (R 166-167) After hearing argu-
ment, the trial judge held that it was "very speculative 
that these things [costs] might come up", and therefore oo 
genuine ic ,lie existed. The judge left the balance of the 
claim of Plaintiff and the corresponding alleged offset to 
be heard at trial. 
ARGUMEHT 
POINT I. NO MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT EXIST AND 
THUS THE PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS 
TO DAMAGES WAS PROPER. 
Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P. allows summary judgment am1 1 
pertinent part provides: 
The Judgment sought shall be renc1crced fc,' 
with if the pleadings, depositions, answers t~ 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, \·•' 
-4-
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with the affidavits, if any, ~w that there is no 
genuine issue as to any materidl fact and thal the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law . 
Thus, the question is whether any material issue of fact 
f'xists. 
This court has outlined the requirements for 
summary judgment in Bulloch v. DeserECt Dodge Truck Center, 
I~., 11 U.2d 1, 354 P.2d 559, 561 (1960): 
A Summary Judgment must be supported 
by evidence, admission and inferences which 
when viewed in the light most favorable 
shows that, "There is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law." Such showing must preclude all 
reasonable possibility that the loser could, 
if given a trial, produce evidence which would 
reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor. 
Upon reviewing the instant case, it must be 
remembered that this is a partial sumr.·.ary judgment, granted 
only to the extent of the difference between Plaintiff's 
claim and Defendant's alleged offsets. Any issue as to the 
v~lidity of Defendant's offsets has been reserved for 
trial. A review of the evidence sho~s that Plaintiff is 
entitled to the $60,862 judgment, as De~e~dant has no 
defense or offset to that amo~nt. 
A. The Pleadings, Answers to Interrogatories and 
the Affidavit Do Not Present Any Material Issues of Fact. 
A review of the pleadings in the instant case 
sliuds that no material issue of fact exists as to the 
-5-
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amount awarded Plaintiff. Both parties acknO\dcdcJl' thi~t_ 
contract for the sum of $766, 168 was entered into etnr2 ti,,· 
$61S,490 had been paid pursuant thereto. Plaintiff the:, 
initiated this suit for the' balance due under the contrcc• 
as its performance was complete. Defendant denied any 
further liability under the contract, but when the actu~l 
defenses and counterclaims were filed, the only defense IF 
breach of the contract by Plaintiff. It must be noted Lh.:: 
in filing the counterclaim on the contract, the Defendant 
has ratified its validity. Therefore, the Defendant nus': 
pay the balance due and owing unless it can prove valid 
reasons for not paying. 
Defendant has attempted to establish valid reuse:• 
for not paying by claiming that Plaintiff has breached the 
contract causing damage to Defendant. The alleged damage 
which the Defendant claimed was $96, 646. Subsequent intu 
rogatories and a deposition have ascertained that Dcfcnclill1 ' 
only alleged damages to the extent of $88, 966. For purpose: 
of its Motion for Partial Surmnary Judgment, Plaintiff hc1s 
acknowledged that material issues of fact exist as to the 
$88, 966 \ ·ch Defendant properly put into issue. Further' 
Plaintiff at the hearing on the motion acknowledged thJt 
Defendant has put an additional $850 into issue by 11. L. 
Harris' affidavit. But Plaintiff and the 101·1cr courl 
were unable to see any issue as to the difference, "'' 
-6-
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,, 1n,plc urithmetic shows that there is $60,862 due and owing 
Lo Plaintiff to which Defendant has no valid claimed offset. 
Defendant quotes extensively from Burningham v. 
ot~, 525 P.2d 620 (Utah 1974) for the proposition that a 
court should not grant a summary judgment until all possible 
shreds of evidence are known. A more careful reading of the 
case demonstrates that this generous language was in the 
context of whether summary judg:c.ent was a harsh remedy, with 
the language quoted by Defendant being severely tempered by 
Chief Justice Ellet's conclusion: 
Gratuitous state~ents put in decisions to the 
effect that a summary judgmer,t is a hursh remedy 
and should never be given if at trial a purty 
might be able to prod~ce evidence which would 
reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor, tends 
to cause trial judges to hesitate to grunt motions 
for summary judgments in those cases where there 
are no disputed issues of materiul facts. The 
only harsh thing about su!l1mary judgments is for a 
trial judge to fail in his duty to ilpply the luw 
and summarily decide a case where there is no 
disputed issues of raterial facts. 
52S P. 2d at 622 (emphasis adc1ec). 
There is no requireme~t that all possible evidence 
b:· before the court. What is required, is that based on the 
~vidence presented there exist no genui~e issue as to 
~' rnateriul fact. As will be de~.::instrated in the next 
section, the affidavit did not add any evidence as to 
LJterial issues, and thus based on the prior pleudings no 
-'erial issues of fuel exist. 
-7-
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of Affiant that Matcri 
Discovery revealed that th( Def<:>ndant clr''''''U 
offsets of $88,966. However, in an attempt to defeat PL1: 
tiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Defendant. dSS( 
by affidavit. filed only five days before the hearing lhJt 
the offsets h<:>ret.ofore claimed were mere estimales and th 
there were other additional costs not yet ascertainablP. 
While Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P. allows the adverse party to file 
affidavits up to the day before the hearing, an affidavic 
should not be used as a stall tactic preventing summary 
judgment. where otherwise justified. This is especially tr. 
in this case where the claims in the affidavit are clearly 
unsubstantiated. 
Utah case law clearly holds that a mere assl'rtir 
by a party that issues of fact exist is insufficient to 
create material issues of fact. 
Manufacturing Co., 17 U.2d 317, 404 P.2d 33 (1965), invol' 
a claim for personal injuries allegedly caused by defcnJ~· 
contractor's negligent installation of a fan manufacture0 
a third party. Even though plaintiff's employer de1u0nc1r,l 
installation of that type of fan, plaintiff attempted to 
bypass this causal factor by alleging that defendant }:.nc:: 
should have known of the danger inherL·11t in the fan· Ti1' 
-8-
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:ciurt upheld the trial court's gra11tin9 of the sun·cn1ary 
jurlyrncnl and stated: 
the plaintiff in the instant case has 
attempted to create factual issues, but the 
whole purpose of surru'1!ary jucl9cr,ent would be 
defeated if a case could be forceu to trial 
by !:_lerc:_ assertion that an issue exists. 
~,dkt;~_:l_i::_y, 18 U.2d 203, 418 P.2d 227 (1966); Foster v. 
------
Steed, 19 U.2d 135, 432 P.2d 60, (1967) where this court 
used the same reasonin9 as it did in the Leninger case. 
In Walker v. Rocky :·lou_ntain Hecreation Corporation, 
29 U.2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973), plaintiff leased certain 
property to defendant corporatic~ for S?ecified remune-
rations. After a series of defaults a~d attempts to correct 
soch, the parties entered into a settlsGent agreen~nt. 
Pl~intiff brought suit to recover the sum stipulated in the 
agreement, and subsequently moved for a summary judgment. 
nefendant filed an affidavit in opposition to the motion 
claiming that plaintiff had breached its fiduciary duty by 
cntcrin9 into unconscionable contracts, that the lease was 
1~c·1·er exercised and that the scttleme:--.': o.:;rcoment was 
improper. This court upheld the trial c~~rt's granting of 
'
1
"-' summary judgment stating "a review of defendant's 
C>p;-cising affidavit reve21ls no evidcntiar:i· facts but merelz 
'_c~lr:_cts _ _!_l_'.~ affi_':'.1_1t' s unsubstantiated c;iinions_ cincl con-
lw.i"n:; in rc9ard to the trctnso:ctions." 508 P.2d at 542 
'h 1·; i :; ciddcd). Thus, since the affida,·i t was mere 
-9-
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uns11bstantiatccl opinion it was insufficient to put issues 
into controversy. 
As these cGiscs illustrate, there must be wGr•: 
the mere allcyations of thee; party that issues c>',;r--tk 
must be substantiated clGiims. In the ins tan l case, tlw 
affidavit purports to outline possible damayes that mcty be 
allocated to Plaintiff. But aside from the $850 clue to tli: 
engineering company, there are no substantiated claims, on' 
mere speculation. An excellent example of such speculali~ 
occurs in paragraph 9 of the affidc:.·it (R 120) which state: 
9. That although he is at this time unable 
to provicle a firm statement of the total costs 
in issue, it is his information and belief that 
said costs are in excess of those set forth in 
the aforesaid pleadings, deposition and answers 
to plaintiff in interrogatories. 
Here, over a year after the roof was put on the building, 
the Defendant is asserting that he thinks there may be cos'· 
in excess of those already set forth during a lenythy clic;-
covery period. Defendant can point to no definite evickncc. 
only a vague "upon information and belief". Such specnlJ-
tion should not be allm-Jecl to defeat a motion for summ'!ry 
judgment. 
Another example which borders on the luc1icnJU 5 15 
found in paragraph 11 of the affidavit (R 120) where Mr. 
Harris states: 
11. Thut defendant has not yet rcccivc·cl 
complete bills for labor and n0teriuls from 
suppliers associated with the trusses an0 
-10-
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light ring, or, if complete bills have been 
received then the portions of sums billed 
attributable • matters at issue in this 
action are n• ~pparent, so that considerable 
additional a ysis is required to determine 
the total sum at issue in this action. That 
the foregoing statement applies to at least 
Neiderhouser Ornamental lron Company, Anderson 
Lumber Company, Heat Rite Engineering Company 
and Gresham Roof. That until said billings 
are complete and/or said analyses are completed, 
the sum alleged in plaintiff's motion as not in 
issue is in fact in issue. 
Defendant apparently argues that there may be 
suppliers who, over one year after supplying material and 
labor on the roof, have not yet submitted a bill for such 
1mrk. Given suppliers' well-known desire to be paid 
promptly, such a billing delay is unli~cly. Further, 
Defendant points to no specific instances where it knows 
Lhat such a dilatory supplier e:dsts. Again Defendant is 
only speculating. 
On the other hand, Mr. Harris asserts in that same 
paragraph that certain suppliers' bills !1:'_i1_Y have portions 
attributable to the roof which T"'.al:'._ be claimed as offsets. 
BGt Mr. Harris states that his company has not yet had time 
Lo analyze the bills to determine 1·:h21t portion, if any, may 
be ch irqed to work on the roof. This claim by Defendant is 
I"acll' months after he siqned ans'.·:ers to interroqatories which 
asked him to determine these very damage items. Surely the 
1
·hn]c discovery process is a nullity if Defendant can answer 
• 11 tcrroqutories in one fashion and then, five days before a 
_1,-y judgment molion is heard, allege that the answers 
-11-
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are "mere estimiltes" and that it really hasn't hacl ti"'c tr, 
compile the cost informalion. 
The trial court judge prqJerly ruled that thco;c 
mere a~:sertions as to possible damges were not enough b' 
create genuine issues of fact. This is a cuse where there 
are no material issues of fact, and if the mere assertions 
of Defendant are allowed to control "the whole purpose of 
sununary judgment would be defeated." As this court statE"I 
in Dupler v. Yates, 10 Ut.2d 251, 351 P.2d 624, 636 (Utah 
1960): 
The primary purpose of the sununary judgment 
procedure is to pierce the allegations of 
the pleadings, show that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact, although an issue 
may be raised by the pleadings, and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. 
Defendants cite Holbrook Company v. Adams, 542 
P.2d 191 (Utah 1975), for the proposition that one sworn 
statement under oath is sufficient to put material issue" 
into controversy. Plaintiff grants that this is the con-
trolling rule if as in the Holbrook case, thG sworn state-
ment presents substanliated evidence. But where the 
affidavit contains only the mere allegations of the party, 
it is insu[ficient to create issues of fact. 
also cited for the pro~osition that the trial court shoul1 
not weigh the evidence. Again, this is true whGn thcrP i: 
conflicting evidence before the court. Here, there 1·:·h 
conflicting evidence, as the mere unsubstantiated c1ilii, 
Defendant should carry no eviclGntary value at all. 
-12-
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L 
c. 
~T_()ti:=cr __ i__ri_ _ _!his Ins tan cc. 
The pleadings of this case show: 
1. Plaintiff's complaint seekin9 payment of 
$150,678 due and owing on the contract. 
2. Defendant's general denial of such obligation 
with an alleged defense only to the extent of $88,966 plus 
$850. 
3. A difference of $60,862.00 between Plain-
tiff's claim and Defendant's alleged offset to which there 
is no valid dispute. 
A motion for partial surrJn:iry judgment as to the 
difference to which there is no valid dispute is entirely 
prntJcr in this instance. 
Carlson v. Milbrad, 415 P.2d 1020 (Wash. 1966) 
involved a sale of some restaura~t property from A to B 
pursuant to a conditional sales co~tract. Upon B's default 
i" accelerated payments and sued for t!:.e aL·.ount due and 
owing. B in defense claimed th&t there had been a release 
nf liability as to them and that they hae an offsetting 
claim for repairs they had to make to e1~iprnent. The trial 
c0un granted A's subsequent motion for swrimary judgment as 
tu lhc amount due and owing, but reserved for trial the 
issues of release and offset. On appe2] the court held the 
1ry judgment as to damages was proper as "There being no 
1i11c; issue as to any materiel fact' (other thon the 
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alleged release and/or setoff), summi.lry j Ud(j111cnl vUo, pi)-
perly rendered." 415 P.2d al 10::>3. Thus, vihere the Pl"J 
etc. dcr11. ~trate that no issues of fact exist as to a p~:: 
of the cL:iim, it is proper to grant a parti21J sunmiciry 
judgment leilving the issues in controversy for trial. 
In Smithers v. Ederer, 303 P.2d 771 (Cal. 19SG), 
plaintiff brought suit for repayment of a loan of $5,000 
made to defendant. As a defense, defendant claimed th~t u 
money was plaintiff's contribution to a joint venture wh~ 
if unsuccessful meant plaintiff was only entitled to re-
payment of $2, 500. Since defendant by his answer onJy 
controverted $2,500 of the claim, plaintiff moved for 
par ti al summary judgment as to the uncontrover tea $ 2, 500. 
The court on appeal held that summary judgment as to the 
uncontrovcrted portion of damages was proper. 
Kuhn Construction Compai:ix~-·-- Sta:J:~, 248 A.2d 612 
(Del. 1968) is a case almost directly on point. In J\uhn, 
the plaintiff had finished construction pursuant to a 
contract and brought suit for the balance due. The defe1 1-
dant in effect admitted that a certain sum was due, but 
disputed the additional charges. The court held that 
partL1l summary judgment as to the undisputed difference 
proper. 
SUMMARY 
Both parties have admitted the existence of 11 '' 
contract and partial payments thereto. So, the c01' l ,-,, 
-14-
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20nccrns the amount remaining to be paid on the contract. 
p]Jintiff in its complaint claimed that the sum of $150,678 
Defendant through its answer, counterclaim, inter-
rogatories, and deposition acknowledged the contract and 
only claimed offsets of $88,966. Since there was a sum of 
$61,712 to which no offsets were claimed, Plaintiff moved 
For J Partial Summary Judgment. At that time, Defendants 
filed an affidavit in opposition to the Motion purporting to 
~uL a larger amount of damages into controversy. Defendant 
claimed other additional expenses were to be allocated to 
rJaintiff, thus increasing the offsets. However other than 
ct mere $850 engineering fee, the affidc·."..·it contained mere 
unsubstantiated speculations that other costs might be due. 
As Utah case law demonstrates, such rr,ere assertions of a 
p<lrty are insufficient to put issues into controversy. 
'I'his case clearly v:arrants a partial summary 
judgment as there is no genuine issue as to the undisputed 
ddl'l3CjCS. This court should affirm the trial courts granting 
uf the motion. 
Respectfu~ly submitted, 
~0tJt~,"' 8 JI dLtJ 
Stzph~ IL.~;;~r~-~ // ~ ;/ '-/ / 1/'l ~,,/ _.,/J, J./1,/ 
Pb.ul S. Felt 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
400 Deserct Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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